(equating various articulations of standards of review "more stringent" than "'reasonableness'" with "strict scrutiny"). It spite of such criticisms, the redistricting accomplished its goal. to Juris. The majority also rejected appellants' claim that North Carolina's reapportionment plan was impermissible. They sought similar relief against the federal appellees, arguing, alternatively, that the federal appellees had misconstrued the Voting Rights Act or that the Act itself was unconstitutional. Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e.g.,Richmond v. J.A. Ante, at 652. As for the second question, I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725 (1983), Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election.2 The. They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. See 425 U. S., at 142, n. 14. App. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Instead, the General Assembly enacted a revised redistricting plan, 1991 N. C. Extra Sess. . 442 U. S., at 272. Cf. Supp., at 467. Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. Hirabayashi v. United States(1943). Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). John Paul . Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snakelike, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. As we have said, however, the very reason that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of all racial classifications is because without it, a court cannot determine whether or not the discrimination truly is "benign." In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? 1. Shaw. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellants have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause. Gomillion is consistent with this view. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. Since I do not agree that appellants alleged an equal protection violation and because the Court of Appeals faithfully followed the Court's prior cases, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,494 (plurality opinion). They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. See ante, at 649. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). The first involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. 6-10 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not, cf. 1984); and, finally, the "concentration of [minority voters] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority," Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46, n. 11 (1986), also called "packing," Voinovich, supra, at 153. ", ity voters-surely they cannot complain of discriminatory treatment.6. This Court has held political gerrymanders to be justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. For the following sentence, locate the action verb and underline it twice. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. There is no independent constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity, and the Court's opinion (despite its many references to the shape of District 12, see ante, at 635-636, 641, 642, 644-648) does not suggest otherwise. Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. Appellants maintain that the General Assembly's revised plan could not have been required by 2. App. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The majority found no support for appellants' contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, 4, or Article I, 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After the 1990 census, the North Carolina General Assembly redrew its congressional districts to account for changes in population. The Court held that members of a racial minority group claiming 2 vote dilution through the use of multimember districts must prove three threshold conditions: that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," that the minority group is "politically cohesive," and that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). Pp. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, No. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. 430 U. S., at 165. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. District 1 has been compared to a "Rorschach ink-blot test," Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. The General Assembly located the second district not in the south-central to southeastern part of the State, but in the north-central region along Interstate 85. Id., at 363. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. 430 U. S., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.). Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,l legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look. Allen v. State Board of Elections(1969) (emphasis added). 8While the Court "express[es] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection claim," ante, at 649 (quoting ante, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting)), it repeatedly emphasizes that there is some reason to believe that a configuration devised with reference to traditional districting principles would present a case falling outside the cause of action recognized today. Under that principle, a proposed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). Writing for three Members of the Court, I justified this conclusion as follows: "It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from those districts. The distinction is untenable. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (1960) (voters alleged to have been excluded from voting in the municipality). Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. It therefore warrants different analysis. Geographically, the State divides into three regions: the eastern Coastal Plain, the central Piedmont Plateau, and the western mountains. The Justices disagreed only as to whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial. 412 U. S., at 754. As explained below, that position cannot be squared with the one taken by the majority in this case. against anyone by denying equal access to the political process. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. The first of the two majority-black districts contained in the revised plan, District 1, is somewhat hook shaped. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in the Texas case, said the path on which the Court had embarked in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision, from which he also dissented, had proven unworkable. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. The largest concentrations of black citizens live in the Coastal Plain, primarily in the northern part. (referring variously to "strict scrutiny," "the standard of review employed in Wygant," and "heightened scrutiny"); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) ("strict scrutiny"); id., at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (classifications" 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives'" (quoting Regents of Univ. 92-357. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. As we explained in Feeney: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only. 3. It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution. Even Justice Whit-. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. SHAW v. RENO (1993) AP U.S. Government and Politics Study Guide IMPACT The decision in Shaw v. Reno led to nationwide changes after the 2000 Census. And those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority." I fail to see how a decision based on a failure to establish discriminatory intent can support the inference that it is unnecessary to prove discriminatory effect. 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause. We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily--without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society."Reynolds v. Sims[1964]. See 808 F. Nor was it ever in doubt that "the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner." ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) Pp. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. 461, 476 (EDNC 1992) (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a "bug splattered on a windshield," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1992, p. A14. North Carolina's failure to respect these principles, in Judge Voorhees' view, "augur[ed] a constitutionally suspect, and potentially unlawful, intent" sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative preclearance from the Attorney General. cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. We also do not decide whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district." US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. Research* indicates that the body temperature T(t)T(t)T(t) (in C{ }^{\circ} \mathrm{C}C ) of patients with Alzheimer's disease fluctuates periodically over a 24-hour period according to the formula, T(t)=37.29+0.46cos[(t16.37)12]T(t)=37.29+0.46 \cos \left[\frac{\pi(t-16.37)}{12}\right] It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. There are three financing options: 1. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Petitioners'. Following is the case brief for Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Case Summary of Shaw v. Reno: The State of North Carolina, in response to the U.S. Attorney General's objection that it had only one majority-black congressional district, created a second majority-black district. North Carolina's initial reapportionment effort included one district purposefully constructed to have a majority of black voters. It also sends to elected representatives the message that their primary obligation is to represent only that group's members, rather than their constituency as a whole. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. 92-357. 14, 27-29. 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